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ARTICLES
UNDERCUTTING LINDENLUMBER: HOW A UNION CAN ACHIEVE
MAJORITY-STATUS BARGAINING WITHOUT AN ELECTION

CharlesJ. Morris*
I. INTRODUCTION

The chief obstacle a union faces in seeking majority-based
collective bargaining under the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"
or "Act"),1 is the specter of the Supreme Court's Linden Lumber
Division, Summer and Co. v. NationalLabor Relations Boarddecision.
The theme of this article is that it is the specter of that decision, not its
holding, that gives an employer the right to insist on an election as a
precondition for collective bargaining, thereby rejecting the role of
stand-alone union authorization cards as proof of majority status. This
article points the way to a belated reopening of a critical non-election
path to collective bargaining, the achievement of which was intended to
be the essence of the NLRA, which in turn was intended to be a key
feature of the American economy. Although Congress never intended
that an election would be the sole route to collective bargaining,3 it has
* Emeritus Professor of Law, Dedman School of Law, Southern Methodist University. A.B. 1944,
Temple University; L.L.B./J.D. 1948, Columbia University. Professor Morris is widely recognized
as an authority on the National Labor Relations Act. His many publications on that subject include
the standard treatise, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW: THE BOARD, THE COURTS, AND THE

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, of which he was the Editor-in-Chief and principal author of its
first and second editions.
1. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (2012)).
2. See Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co., 190 N.L.R.B. 718 (1971), enforcement denied
sub nom. Truck Drivers Local No. 413 v. NLRB, 487 F.2d 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1973), rev'd sub nom.,
Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301 (1974).
3. Id. at 312 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (citing H.R. REP. No. 80-510, at 41 (1947) (Conf.
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so developed that winning an election conducted by the National Labor
Relations Board ("NLRB," "Labor Board," or "Board") has become the
sine qua non of almost all initiations of the process. As a consequence, a
major impediment to a union achieving majority status, and thus the
right to bargain as a majority-exclusive representative under section
8(a)(5), 4 is the requirement that it first prove its majority status through
an election which, as the historical record shows, 5 has become an
obstacle-course that strongly favors the employer.6
II. BACKGROUND
The long-established basis for the foregoing requirement, which
gives the employer the right to lawfully refuse to bargain unless the
union has first won a Board-conducted certification election is the
aforesaid Linden Lumber decision, which the Nixon NLRB issued in
1971. 7 That decision, after its initial rejection by the D.C. Court of
Appeals, 8 was ratified by a sharply divided Supreme Court. 9 However,
contrary to popular misconception, that Court's majority opinion did not
mandate the Board's rule; rather, with the following language, it merely
qualifiedly allowed it as a permitted precondition to collective
bargaining: "[W]e cannot say that the Board's decision that the union
should go forward and ask for an election on the employer's refusal to
recognize the authorization cards was arbitrary and capricious or an
abuse of discretion."10
The Linden rule is thus only an agency's "permissible" construction
Rep.)).
4.
5.

See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5). For statutory text, see infra note 17.
See KATE L. BRONFENBRENNER, Employer Behavior in CertificationElections and First-

Contract Campaigns: Implications for Labor Law Reform, in RESTORING THE PROMISE OF

AMERICAN LABOR LAW 75, 80-82 (Sheldon Friedman etal. eds., 1994); see also Alan Story,
Employer Speech, Union RepresentationElections, andthe FirstAmendment, 16 BERKELEY J. EM.
& LAB. L. 356, 414-15 (1995).
6. See, e.g., Harborside Healthcare, Inc., 343 N.L.R.B. 906, 916-17 & n.14 (2004) (Liebman
& Walsh, Members, dissenting in part) ("At the direction of their employer, supervisors-up to the
highest company official-may urge their subordinates to vote against unionization. Indeed,
employers are free to compel employees to listen to their anti-union message, in captive audience
meetings, one-on-one encounters, and other settings, while excluding union representatives."
(citations omitted)).
7. Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co., 190 N.L.R.B. 718 (1971), enforcement denied sub
nom. Truck Drivers Local No. 413 v. NLRB, 487 F.2d 1099 (D.C. Cit. 1973), rev'd sub nom.
Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301 (1974).
8. TruckDriversLocal No. 413,487 F.2dat 1113.
9. Linden Lumber, 419 U.S. at 310.
10. Id.at309-10.
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of the statute-as it was correctly and expressly so labeled by Supreme
Court Justice Stewart in his dissenting opinion. 1 As this article will
confirm, it was not an agency's "clear" and "unambiguous" mandatory
construction of statutory text spelled out by Congress in accordance with
the familiar but later-articulated standard expressed in Chevron, U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.12 Accordingly, the
tribunal primarily responsible for the prevailing interpretation that an
election can be a prerequisite for a union's right to bargain was not the
1974 Supreme Court, but rather the 1971 NLRB."3 Thus, responsibility
for the failure to reverse that "permissible" reading, and to replace it
with a reading more consistent with the Act's true policy, lies with
subsequent Labor Boards. Nevertheless, during the four-plus decades in
which there has been no direct challenge to the application of the Linden
rule, the labor-relations community appears to have accepted-with only
rare and recent exceptions 1a--that this rule was unchangeably inscribed
in stone by the Supreme Court. 15
Apparently based on that
misunderstanding, the American labor movement spent an enormous
amount of time and money seeking, unsuccessfully, to change that rule
by congressional passage of the Employee Free Choice Act ("EFCA")an approach that proved counter-productive. 16
Notwithstanding the passage of time, a Labor Board that is so
inclined will have clear legal authority to change that regressive rule
11.
"I cannot agree with the Court's conclusion that this Board policy constitutes a
permissible interpretation of §§ 8 (a)(5) and 9(a) of the Act." Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., dissenting)

(emphasis added); see also Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843
(1984).
12. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43; see also infra notes 79-102.
13. See infra notes 79-102.
14. See, e.g., Halima Woodhead, Can Card-CheckBe UnilaterallyImposed by the NLRB?, 1
AM. U. LAB. & EMP. L.F. 85, 94 (2011). Prompted by the stir created within the employer
community by the inclusion of a provision for card-check certification in the Employee Free Choice
Act ("EFCA"), H.R. 1409, S. 560, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009), the author answers her titlequestion with a "yes" but deems the process undesirable. Id. at 86-87, 99-100.
15. As one commentator observed as recently as 2009, the Linden rule was "enshrined in the
national labor policy by... the Supreme Court." Henry H. Drummonds, Beyond the Employee
Free Choice: Unleashing the States in Labor-ManagementRelations Policy, 9 CORNELL J. L. &
PUB. POL'Y 83, 99 (2009).
16. Employee Free Choice Act, H.R. 1409, S. 560, 111th Cong. (2009). Aside from not
achieving passage, this bill served to educate the employer lobby about the NLRA to organizedlabor's disadvantage. Among the fall-out products of the EFCA effort was the ammunition it
provided that lobby with some of the means to block former union attorney Craig Becker from full

NLRB membership with the argument that he would use the appointment to achieve, through NLRB
action, union card-majority certification, which Congress had rejected as a part of EFCA. See
Editorial, Back Door Card Check, WALL ST. J., (Sept.
14, 2010, 12:01 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB 10001424052748703597204575483882585485368.
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without further legislation, as this article will demonstrate. First in
order, however, is an examination of the Act's pertinent language and
the historical treatment of the underlying issue.
A. Statutory Text andHistorical Treatment
The statutory text governing majority-union bargaining is simple
and straight-forward. Section 8(a)(5) provides that it shall be an unfair
labor practice for an employer "to refuse to bargaincollectively with the
representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of section
9(a). 17 Section 9(a) provides that "[r]epresentatives designated or
selectedfor the purposes of collective bargainingby the majority of the
employees in a unit appropriatefor such purposes, shall be the exclusive
representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of
collective bargaining . ,, 8 However, the Act does not specify how
such a representative (i.e. a union), shall be so "designated" or
"selected," or provide definitions of those key words; 19 these are
20
therefore words which Congress left to the NLRB for interpretation.
Under the original Wagner Act, a union's section 9(a) majority was
not dependent on an election, for section 9(c) expressly allowed the
Board to certify majority status by "a secret ballot. . . or ...any other
suitable method,' which was typically union authorization cards.2 2 In
1939, however, in Cudahy Packing Co.,23 the Board abandoned that
reliance on authorization cards and confined certifications to the

17. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act of 1935 § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (2012)
(emphasis added). In addition, section 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), more generally provides that
it "shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer.., to interfere with, restrain, employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7... Id. And the pertinent part of section 7, 29
U.S.C. § 157, reads as follows:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection [and may refrain from

such activities pursuant to this section].
Id. § 157.
18. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (emphasis added).
19. Id.
20. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843
(1984); see also infra notes 79-102 and accompanying text.
21. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1947).
22. See ABA SECTION OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW:
THE BOARD, THE COURTS, AND THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 788 (John E. Higgins, Jr. et

al. eds., 6th ed. 2012) [hereinafter THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW].
23. Cudahy Packing Co., 13 N.L.R.B. 526 (1939).
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election-process. 24 Thus, except where it could be shown that the
employer lacked a good-faith doubt that the union represented a majority
of the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit, the requirement of an
25
election became the Board's standard certification policy.

Nevertheless, as it had been recognized from the Wagner Act's
very beginning and continued long thereafter, it was understood that
union bargaining-rights were not limited to the election process, for the
language of section 8(a)(5)-which has never been changed-is
unequivocal in its requirement that an employer has a duty to bargain
"with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of
section 9 (a)"--text which contains no mention of elections or
certifications. 26 In 1940, in NLRB v. Dahlstrom Metallic Door Co., the
Second Circuit expressly approved that concept by confirming that an
employer's duty to bargain existed whenever the union presented
"convincing evidence of majority support., 27 And as the Supreme Court
in 1956 held in United Mine Workers v. Arkansas Flooring Co., 28 and

reconfirmed in 1969 in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co. Inc.,29 "[a] Board
election is not the only method by30 which an employer may satisfy itself
as to the union's majority status."
With passage of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, 3' by virtue of three
distinct actions Congress played a key role in defining the collective
bargaining obligation here in issue: (1) it amended section 9(c) to make
the election process the sole basis for certification; 32 (2) it expressly
rejected in conference committee a provision in the House bill which
would have confined the bargaining obligation only to unions certified
33
pursuant to an NLRB election or currently recognized by the employer;
24.

Id. at 531-32.

25.

Id.

26. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 596 (1969).
27. NLRB v. Dahlstrom Metallic Door Co., 112 F.2d 756, 757 (2d Cir. 1940) ("The
contention that bargaining was not mandatory until the Board had accredited [the union] as
bargaining agent is frivolous. An employer is under a duty to bargain as soon as the union
representative presents convincing evidence of majority support."); see also NLRB v. Remington
Rand, Inc., 94 F.2d 862, 868 (2d Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 576 (1938).

28.

United Mine Workers v. Ark. Oak Flooring Co., 351 U.S. 62, 72-75 (1956).

29.
30.
31.

Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. at 597; see also infra Part TH.
United Mine Workers, 351 U.S. at 72 n.8.
Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat.

136 (1947) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
32. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (2012).
33. Section 8(a)(5) in H.R. 3020 was rejected in Conference. H.R. REP. No.80-510, at 41-42
(1947) (Conf. Rep.). This was so noted in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. at 598, and in the
court of appeals opinion in Truck Drivers Local No. 413 v. NLRB, 487 F.2d 1099, 1110 (D.C. Cir.
1973), and also in the Supreme Court's dissenting opinion in Linden, 419 U.S. 301, 312 (1974)
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and (3) it granted employers a right to petition for an election under the
new Section 9(c)(1)(B), the pertinent text of which is the following:
(1) Whenever a petition shall have been filed, in
accordance with such regulations as may be
prescribed by the Board . . . (B) by an employer,
alleging that one or more individuals or labor
organizations have presented to him a claim to be
recognized as the representative defined in subsection
(a) of this section . . . the Board shall investigate such
petition and if it has reasonable cause to believe that a
question of representation affecting commerce exists
shall provide for an appropriate hearing upon due
notice.... If the Board finds upon the record of such a
hearing that such a question of representation exists, it
shall direct an election
by secret ballot and shall certify
34
the results thereof.
Shortly after passage of Taft-Hartley the Board issued a decision in Joy
Silk Mills, Inc., which established the rule that if an employer has a
"good faith" doubt as to a union's majority based on authorization cards,
it could lawfully refuse to bargain and thus require the union to prove its
majority through an NLRB election.3 5 The employer, however, had no
burden of proving any basis for its doubt; rather, it was deemed the
General Counsel's burden to disprove'the legitimacy of the employer's
claim.36 Notwithstanding various adjustments that were made from time
to time, the Joy Silk rule remained the commonly described rule until the
Supreme Court's 1969 Gissel decision, 37 although in actual practice it
had been modified to equate commission of serious unfair labor
practices with an absence of good faith doubt, which the Supreme Court
described in its Gissel opinion as follows:

(Stewart, J., dissenting).
34.
29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)(B).
35.
Joy Silk Mills, Inc., 85 N.L.R.B. 1263, 1264-65 (1949), enforced, 185 F.2d 732 (1950).
36. See John P. Serpa, Inc., 155 N.L.R.B. 99, 100 (1965) ("Where the General Counsel seeks
to establish a violation of section 8(a)(5) on the basis of a card showing, he has the burden of
proving not only that a majority of employees in the appropriate unit signed cards designating the
union as bargaining representative, but also that the employer in bad faith declined to recognize and
bargain with the union."); see also Aaron Bros. Co., 158 N.L.R.B. 1077, 1081 (1966) (making clear
this shift of burden of proof to the General Counsel, on behalf of the charging-party union, to show
the employer's bad faith in refusing to rely on authorization cards).
37. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 596 (1969).
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[T]he Board announced at oral argument that it had
virtually abandoned the Joy Silk doctrine altogether.
Under the Board's current practice, an employer's good
faith doubt is largely irrelevant, and the key to the
issuance of a bargaining order is the commission of
serious unfair labor practices that interfere with the
election processes and tend to preclude the holding of a
fair election.38
III. THE GISSEL CASE
In Gissel the Court reviewed four appellate cases that had raised,
under varying circumstances, the extent of the employer's duty to
bargain where the union's majority in each had been based solely on
union authorization cards. 39 After reviewing pertinent legal history,
including administrative and judicial decisions such as the cases noted
above, the Court began its analyses by stating that it "need not decide
whether a bargaining order is ever appropriate in cases where there is no
interference with the election processes, '40 which was the issue that
would be treated later in Linden.41 It then addressed the double-barreled
question of "whether a union can establish a bargaining obligation by
means other than a Board election and whether the validity of alternate
routes to majority status, such as cards, was affected by the 1947 TaftHartley amendments. 42 The Court responded to the first half of that
' 43
question by stressing that a "union is not limited to a Board election,
citing the statutory language in sections 8(a)(5) and 9(a) and the
sufficiency of "convincing evidence of majority support" that was
highlighted in the 1940 Dahlstrom Metallic Door Co. case, 44 whereupon
it reiterated that:
Almost from the inception of the Act, then, it was

38. Id. at 594.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 595.
41. See Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301 (1974).
42. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. at 595-96.
43. Id.at 596 (deciding a Board election is not the only method by which an employer can
achieve union's majority status); see also United Mine Workers v. Ark. Oak Flooring Co., 351 U.S.
62, 71-72 & n.8 (1956) (deciding a Board election is not the only method by which an employer can
achieve union's majority status).
44. NLRB v. Dahlstrom Metallic Door Co., 112 F.2d 756, 757 (2d Cir. 1940).
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recognized that a union did not have to be certified as
the winner of a Board election to invoke a bargaining
obligation; it could establish majority status by other
means under the unfair labor practice provision of §
8(a)(5).... We see no reason to reject this approach to
bargaining obligations now ....
Responding to the second half of the question, the Gissel Court
called attention to a version of the bill in the House that would have
amended section 8(5) (the present 8(a)(5)) by limiting the Board's
findings of a refusal-to-bargain violation only to where an employer had
failed to bargain with a currently recognized or election-certified
union.4 6 That amendment, which would have eliminated any reliance on
authorization cards, was rejected in conference.4 7 The Court further
stated that the Taft-Hartley addition of a means for an employer to
petition for an election under section 9(c)(1)(B) was not a grant of "an
absolute right to an election at any time" but was rather a means for
employers "to test out their doubts as to a union's majority in a secret
ballot election. 'A 8 The Court stated definitively that; "[W]e hold that the
1947 amendments did not restrict an employer's duty to bargain under §
8(a)(5) solely to those unions whose representative status is certified
after a Board election.'49
The Court then addressed the question of "whether authorization
cards are such inherently unreliable indicators of employee desires that,
whatever the validity of other alternate routes to representative status,
the cards themselves may never be used to determine a union's majority
and to support an order to bargain." 50 Regarding the proffered
objections, to wit, that
cards cannot accurately reflect an employee's wishes,
either because an employer has not had a chance to
present his views and thus a chance to insure that the
employee choice was an informed one, or because the

45. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. at 596-98 (citing National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act of
1935 §§ 8(a)(5), 9(a), Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§
158(a)(5), 159(a))).
46. Id.at 598.
47. See supranote 33 and accompanying text.
48. Gissel PackingCo., 395 U.S. at 599.
49. Id.at 600.
50. Id. at 601.
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choice was the result of group pressures [and] ...too

often

obtained
51

through

misrepresentation

and

coercion[.]

The Court found none of these reasons sufficiently persuasive; it
therefore concluded that "cards, though admittedly inferior to the
election process, can adequately reflect employee sentiment when that
process has been impeded .... The Court observed that
[t]he Board itself has recognized... that secret elections
are generally the most satisfactory-indeed the
preferred-method of ascertaining whether a union has
majority support. The acknowledged superiority of the
election process, however, does not mean that cards are
thereby rendered totally invalid, for where an employer
engages in conduct disruptive of the election process,
cards may be the most effective-perhaps
the only53
way of assuring employee choice.
Whether the NLRB's secret ballot elections a half-century later
continue to be the preferred-method to determine whether a union has
majority support remains to be seen-as we shall see later.54 More
important, however, the Gissel Court specifically left open several issues
dealing with the reliability of cards, asserting that it
need not decide whether, absent election interference by
an employer's unfair labor practices, he may obtain an
election only if he petitions for one himself; whether, if
he does not, he must bargain with a card majority if the
Union chooses not to seek an election; and whether, in
the latter situation, he is bound by the Board's ultimate
determination of the card results regardless of his earlier
good faith doubts, or whether he can still insist on a
Union-sought election if he makes an affirmative
showing of his positive reasons for believing there is a
representation dispute. In short, a union's right to rely
on cards as a freely interchangeable substitute for
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id.at 602.
Id.at 603.
Id.at 602.
See infra text accompanying notes 110-14.
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elections where there has been no election interference
is notput in issue here ....
Notwithstanding the subsequent decision in Linden Lumber,56 those
issues remain to this day mostly open.
IV. LINDEN LUMBER AND ITS CHEVRONITE APPLICATION

The aforesaid open issues were partially addressed by the Board in
1971 in Linden Lumber.57 However, as I shall demonstrate, the final
decision in that case, i.e., the Supreme Court's, failed to provide a
definitive resolution of the issues that it had left. open, in.Gissel-,
contrary to what the labor-relations community generally, but,
inaccurately, has assumed.5 8 Our attention begins with the majorityopinion of the three Republican Board members,59 which held that an
employer in denying union recognition will not be found guilty of a
refusal to bargain in violation of section 8(a)(5) where the only evidence
of the union's claimed majority consists of union authorization cards,
with motive not an issue absent the commission of serious unfair labor
practices; whereupon the union's claim of majority status can be
60
resolved only by its petitioning for an NLRB secret ballot election.
Purporting to address the Gissel open issue of whether the employer who
insists on an election must'initiate the election 'process, the majority
reasoned that the facts of the case
have caused us to reassess the wisdom of attempting to
divine, in retrospect, the state of employer (a)
55..

Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. at.601 n.18( emphasis added)._

-

-.

,

,

56. Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co., 190 N.L.R.B. 718 (1971), enforcement denied sub
nom. Truck Drivers Local No. 413 v. NLRB, 487 F.2d 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1973), rev'd sub nom..
Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301 (1974).
57. Linden Lu'mber, 190 N.L.R.B. at 720-21.
58. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text. And note that the standard treatise on the
NLRA carelessly records that the Supreme Court "answered those questions in Linden Lumber" and
"adopted the Board's position." THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw, supra note 22, at 832 (emphasis
added). In the interest of full disclosure, I was the Editor-in-Chief of the second edition of that
treatise and therefore take responsibility for its earlier careless allegation that stated that: "the Court
held' what the Board had ruled. THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW: THE BOARD, THE COURTS, AND

THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 348-490 (Charles J. Morris et al. eds., 2d ed. 1983).
Although its full description at 522-23 was accurate. Id. at 522-23.
59. Chairman Edward B. Miller and members Howard Jenkins, Jr. and Ralph E. Kennedy.
See Stephen C. Vladeck, Nixon Boardand Retail Bargaining Units, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 416, 416,
429-30 (1976).
60. See Linden Lumber, 190 N.L.R.B. at 721.
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knowledge and (b) intent at the time he refuses to
accede to a union demand for recognition. Unless ...
the employer has agreed to let its "knowledge" of
majority status be established through a means other
than a Board election, how are we to evaluate whether it
"knows" or whether it "doubts" majority status? And if
we are to let our decisions turn on an employer's
"willingness" to have majority status determined by an
election, how are we to judge "willingness" if the record
is silent ... or doubtful, as here, as to just how "willing"
the Respondent is in fact? We decline, in summary, to
reenter the "good-faith" thicket of Joy Silk .... These
considerations lead us to the conclusion that Respondent
should not be found guilty of a violation of Section
8(a)(5) solely upon the basis of its refusal to accept
evidence of majority status other than the results of a
Board election.61
Rather than focusing pointedly on the broad implications of the
majority's decision, the two Democratic Board members62 concentrated
in their dissent on the undisputed evidence which showed, based on a
"strike in which a majority of the employees [had] openly reaffirmed
their support of the union," that the employer "had knowledge,
independently of the authorization cards, that a majority of its employees
supported the Union"; accordingly, they contended that those facts
warranted a bargaining order.63
The D.C. Court of Appeals, however, recognized in its reviewing
opinion the far-reaching implications of the majority's decision when it
asserted that the Board had
adopted a "voluntarist" view of the duty to bargain.
Absent unfair labor practices or an agreement to
determine majority status through means other than an
election, such as a poll, the employer has no duty to
recognize the union. This means, in effect, that as a
"' • matter of law, the decision to recognize a union on the
61.

Id. at 720-21 (citing Joy Silk Mills, Inc., 85 N.L.R.B. 1263 (1949), enforced, Joy Silk

Mills, Inc. v. NLRB, 185 F.2d 732 (1950)).
62. - Members John H. Fanning and Gerald A. Brown dissented. Linden Lumber, 190
N.L.R.B. at 721-24.

63.

Id. at 722.
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basis of cards is entirely within the control of the
employer; neither "bad faith" or "independent
knowledge" can lay the predicate for recognition
because those concepts are deemed unworkable.6 4
That opinion noted that although the Board's decision allowed an
employer who was not guilty of misconduct to give no affirmative
reason for rejecting a recognition request based on authorization cards or
a majority indicated by a strike, a refusal to bargain was nevertheless
deemed justified based on the employer's independent knowledge of the
union's majority. 65 The court observed that "[w]hile it may be that there
would be difficulties in determining the state of past employer
knowledge... we cannot accept the view that this requires a union
petition for an election as the only means for obtaining recognition,"
whereupon, it proceeded to examine another predicate for issuance of a
bargaining order.66
That other predicate pointed to the employer's failure to evidence
its own "good faith doubt" by itself petitioning for an election under
section 9(c)(1)(B), stressing that the Gissel Court had noted that the
legislative history of this provision indicated that "the right to petition
for an election was a way in which the employer could remove his
doubt., 67 The court of appeals therefore charged the Board with
ignoring "the very intent behind [that] statutory provision" and being
"willing to resolve every assertion of doubt in the employer's favor,
without permitting any 'test' of those doubts. 68 Accordingly, it
concluded with the following statement reversing the Board's decision:
While we have indicated that cards alone, or
recognitional strikes and ambiguous utterances of the
employer, do not necessarily provide such "convincing
evidence of majority support" so as to require a
bargaining order, they certainly create a sufficient
probability of majority support as to require an
employer asserting a doubt of majority status to resolve
the possibility through a petition for an election, if he is
64. Truck Drivers Union Local No. 413 v. NLRB, 487 F.2d 1099, 1106 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(emphasis added).
65. Seeid.at 1110.
66. Id.
67. Id.at1110-11.
68. Id. at I111.
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to avoid both any duty to bargain and any inquiry into
the actuality of his doubt.69
A closely divided Supreme Court reversed that decision. 70 How
that was achieved might seem to pose an enigma-but only
superficially-for the concluding language in Justice Douglas's majority
opinion that sustained the Board's holding might be viewed, at least in a
surface reading, as afinal determination of the issues that were left open
71
in Gissel- which is how it has been generally viewed historically but a careful reading of the opinion, particularly the paragraph preceding
that final paragraph and its unchallenged labeling by the dissenting
opinion, clearly and fully resolves any enigmatic problem. 72 Here is the
closing paragraph in Justice Douglas's opinion:
In sum, we sustain the Board in holding that, unless an
employer has engaged in an unfair labor practice that
impairs the electoral process, a union with authorization
cards purporting to represent a majority of the
employees, which is refused recognition, has the burden
of taking the next step in invoking the Board's election
procedure.73
That this was a timely but not a final determination of the issues is
confirmed by the immediately preceding paragraph, which indicated that
this policy was permissible because it met the requirements of the canon
of statutory construction regarding judicial deference to an agency's
interpretation of statutory text that Congress left for agency
interpretation.74 Here is that penultimate paragraph:
In light of the [Act's] statutory scheme and the practical
administrative procedural questions involved, we cannot
rIr.

69. Id. "The Board might, in order to reduce litigation and delay in these matters, adopt the
rule that an employer must, when presented with an authorization card majority, either recognize the
union or, within a reasonable time, petition for a certification election." Id. at I 111 n.47.
70. A five-to-four decision with majority opinion by Justice Douglas was joined by Chief
Justice Burger, Justices Blackman, Brennan, and Rehnquist, Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co. v.
NLRB, 419 U.S. 301, 301 (1974); dissenting opinion by Justice Stewart was joined by Justices
White, Marshall, and Powell. Id. at 310.
71.
72.

See supranotes 14-16, 58 and accompanying text.
See Linden Lumber, 419 U.S. at 309-10 & n.l0.

73. Id. at 310 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
74. See id.
at 309-10.
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say that the Board's decision that the union should go
forward and ask for an election on the employer's
refusal to recognize the authorization cards was
arbitraryand capricious or an abuse of discretion.75
Further confirmation that this was but a permissible construction is
contained in the opening paragraph of Justice Stewart's dissenting
opinion, where he stated: "I cannot agree with the Court's conclusion
that this Board policy constitutes a permissible interpretation of §§
8(a)(5) and 9(a) of the Act.",76 Thus, although the Court's majority
accepted the Board's decision, this was but their judicial recognition of
the permissible nature of the construction in accordance with Justice
Douglas's penultimate paragraph, that the Board's decision was not
"arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion. 7 7 It was definitely
not a Chevron-type mandatory reading of statutory text, i.e., an
"unambiguously expressed intent of Congress., 78 Rather, it was an
agency's Chevron-type second-step construction of a provision as to
which
the statute is silent or -ambiguous with respect to the
specific issue [where] the question for the court is
whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute....
Such legislative
regulations are given controlling weight unless they are
arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the
statute.79
75. Id. (emphasis added); see Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.,' 467 U.S.
837, 844 (1984).
76. Linden Lumber, 419 U.S. at 310 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
77. Id.at31O.
78. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
79. Id. at 843-44 (emphasis added). With regard to review of the NLRB's construction of
statutory text, Chevron was an articulation of the Supreme Court's long-established standard of
judicial review of administrative statutory interpretation, not a change in that interpretive authority,
as confirmed by the Court. Id. at 843 & n. 11. This is illustrated by the following pre-Linden cases:
NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 236 (1963) ("[Board action was] not inadequate,
irrational or arbitrary .... [The Board has a] special function of applying the general provisions of
the Act to the complexities of industrial life .... ); NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 449,
353 U.S. 87, 96 (1957) (discussing the function of balancing "conflicting legitimate interests" so as
to "effectuate national labor policy is often a difficult and delicate responsibility, which the
Congress [has] committed primarily to the [NLRB], subject to limited judicial review"); NLRB v.
Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344, 346 (1953) ("[Congress] charge[d] the Board with the task of
devising remedies to effectuate the policies of the Act.... [T]he power, which is a broad
discretionary one, is for the Board to wield, not for the courts."); NLRB v. A. J. Tower Co., 329

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol35/iss1/3

14

Morris: Undercutting <i>Linden Lumber: How a Union Can Achieve Majority-S
2017]

UNDERCUTTING LINDENLUMBER

We are thus dealing here with the multifaceted word "designated"
in section 9(a), which is the key word to which the agency must affix a
permissible meaning in determining what is required for majority-union
The Court's approval of the Board's
representational status. 8°
construction in Linden was an approval of but one of many conceivable
readings of that word, one that-despite its shortcomings-was deemed
by the Court's majority not to be "arbitrary" or "capricious," 81 these
being the age-old standards which, as noted above, the Court spelled out
as criteria for disapproval of an alleged impermissible reading in its
1984 Chevron decision. 2

V. PROPOSED REPLACEMENT RULE
A. The EssentialElements
As noted, the current Linden rule is derived from an apparently
permissible-albeit contrived-construction of what "designated"
means in section 9(a) of the Act.83 From this, the Supreme Court
approved the Board's allowing an employer's reasonless insistence on
84
an election-certification as a precondition for its duty to bargain.
Although that is the exact precondition for bargaining that Congress
expressly rejected in passing Taft-Hartley,8 5 with its acceptance by the
Court in Linden there is no choice but to recognize it as a permissible
reading, hence a lawful construction of the Act. Fortunately, however, it
is only permissible, hence replaceable. In fact-given the will by the
NLRB-,-it should be easily replaceable by a more satisfactory
permissible rule..
'The soon-to-be-described rule-change that I shall here propose can
U.S:.324, 330 (1946) ("Congress has entrusted the Board with a wide degree of discretion in
establishing the procedure and safeguards necessary to insure the fair and free choice of bargaining
r4resentatives by employees."); NLRB v. Hearst Publ'ns, 322 U.S. 111, 131 (1944) ("[W]here the
question is one of specific application of a broad statutory term in a proceeding in which the agency
administering the statue must determine it initially, the reviewing court's function is limited.");
Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941) ("[T]he relation ofremedy to policy is
peculiarly a matter for administrative competence ...
80. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43; supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text; infra notes
8 102 and accompanying text.
81. Linden Lumber, 419 U.S. at 310.
82. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
83. See supra notes 77-82 and accompanying text.
84. See Linden Lumber, 419 U.S. at 309-10.
85. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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be viewed as the result of a normal evolutionary process that is
comparable to the rulemaking procedure which the Supreme Court
reviewed in Chevron, where, with reference to the agency's earlier
interpretation of the statutory term in issue, the Court observed that the
"agency interpretation is not instantly carved in stone. On the contrary,
the agency, to engage in informed rulemaking, must consider varying
interpretations and the wisdom of its policy on a continuing basis. 86
That is exactly what the NLRB has often accomplished with its changes
to existing rules-and with judicial approval. As the Court emphasized
in NLRB v. J Weingarten,Inc.,
[t]he use by an administrative agency of the evolutional
approach is particularly fitting. To hold that the Board's
earlier decisions froze the development of [an]
important aspect of the national labor law would
misconceive
the
nature
of
administrative
decisionmaking.... The responsibility to adapt the Act
to changing
patterns of industrial life is entrusted to the
7
Board.1
Also pertinent here is the Court's rationale in NLRB v. Curtin
Matheson Scientific, Inc., that "a Board rule is entitled to deference even
if it represents a departure from the Board's prior policy. '88 In fact,
there are numerous cases where the Board has altered a rule or practice
in order to revise its coverage or respond to changed conditions. 89 For
example, with reference in the above Weingarten case, the Board
changed its position as to whether an employer's denial of an
employee's request for union presence during an investigative
disciplinary interview violates sections 7 and 8(a)(1). 90
And in
91
American Hospital Ass'n v. NLRB, the Supreme Court approved the
Board's changing of its long-standing policy regarding
the
92
appropriateness of a comprehensive health-care bargaining unit.
86. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863-64.
87. NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 265-66 (1975).
88. NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775, 787 (1990); see also NLRB v.
Local Union No. 103, Int'l Ass'n of Iron Workers, 434 U.S. 335, 351 (1978) (regarding a defensible
construction of the statute: "An administrative agency is not disqualified from changing its
mind.
89. See infra notes 90-102 and accompanying text.
90. J.Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. at 265-66.
91. Am. Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606 (1991).
92. Id. at 618.
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Probably the most famous-some might say infamous-example of
the Board's rule-replacement process can be found in the saga of the
aforesaid Weingarten rights in the nonunion workplace.9 3 The Board
first articulated the existence of that right in the 1982 Materials
Research Corp. case,94 which was overruled three years later in Sears,
Roebuck & Co., where the Board held that rejection of the Material
Research rule was compelled by the Act. 95 This was followed by an
intricate series of decisions, appeals, and remands that began with E.I.
Du Pont de Nemours & Co. 96 and substantially culminated with the
Board's 1989 decision in Slaughter v. NLRB, 97 the ultimate result of
which was that such rejection of coverage, though enforceable, was only
a permissible and not a mandatory construction, which the Board
conceded.98 The next episode in this saga was the Board's overruling of
the Du Pont decision in Epilepsy Foundationof Northeast Ohio,99 which
the D.C. Court of Appeals affirmed.100 That was followed by the most
recent episode, which was the Board's reversal of Epilepsy in IBM
Corp.10 1 with recognition that either interpretation is permissible. 0 2 All
of which reinforces the Board's authority to replace
one permissible
03
reading.1
permissible
another
with
Act
the
of
reading
Accordingly, to fulfill the declared purpose of the Act of
"encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining," 1°4 the
Linden rule needs to be replaced with a fresh and more sensible rule that
will restore the original intended meaning to the statutory requisite for
collective bargaining under section 9(a). That replacement rule should
be based on a simple but reasonably verifiable assessment of whether a
majority of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit have
"designated" the union as their collective bargaining representative.
That is all that is required for such bargaining. As the historical and
93.

See Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 265-66; see also Jeff Sloan et al., Public Employees Entitled

to Union Rep at Accommodation Meetings, 25 NO. 2 CAL. EMP. L. LETTER 1, (Apr. 2015)

(noting the famous Weingarten rights).
94.
See Materials Research Corp., 262 N.L.R.B. 1010, 1014 (1982), overruled in relevant
part by Sears, Roebuck & Co., 274 N.L.R.B. 230 (1985).

95.
96.

See Sears, Roebuck & Co., 274 N.L.R.B. at 230 & n.1.
See E.I. DuPont De Nemours, 289 N.L.R.B. 627, 630-31 & n.16 (1988).

97.

See generally Slaughter v. NLRB, 876 F.2d 11 (3d Cir. 1989).

98.

Id. at 13.

99.
100.

Epilepsy Found. of Ne. Ohio, 331 N.L.R.B. 676, 682 (2000).
Epilepsy Found. of Ne. Ohio v. NLRB, 268 F.3d 1095, 1105 (D.C. Cir. 2001).

101.

IBM Corp., 341 N.L.R.B. 1288, 1295 (2004).

102. Id.
103.

See supranotes 90-102.

104. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act of 1935 § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012).
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judicial records have demonstrated, Congress specifically rejected the
requirement of election-certification as a precondition for an enforceable
105
duty to bargain.
Indeed, as the text of the Act and its legislative history indicate, an
election is the intended secondary, not primary, means for establishing a
bargainable majority.10 6 The statutory text stipulates that an election can
be ordered only if the Board "has reasonable cause to believe that a
question of representation affecting commerce exists,"' 1 7 which is the
Taft-Hartley Act's retention of the same key requirement in the original
section 9(c), that a question concerning representation must exist as a
precondition for conducting an election. 10 8 Thus, as the text of the Act
literally requires for recognition, where a union represents a validly
designated majority of employees in an appropriate bargaining unit and
requests recognition and bargaining-and the employer refuses-an
election cannot be ordered because a question concerning representation
does not exist. Those facts describe an unfair labor practice-i.e., a
refusal to bargain in violation of sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5)-for which
a valid charge and complaint would be appropriate.
In order to fully understand the meaning of the key words of section
9(a) in issue-primarily the word "designated," but also the lessapplicable word "selected"--one should recognize that both of these
words involve communication and action. "Selected" is appropriate
where there is more than one union vying for representation, which
occurs only rarely. "Designated," the broader term that applies to a
single representative, is therefore the word that requires our primary
attention. According to its standard dictionary meaning, "designated" is
an adjective that equates with the past tense of the verb "designate,"
which means to "show," "indicate," "mark," ''point out,' ".signify,"
"specify," "denote," or "name."10 9 It is an indication of a communicated
action, not of a determined or quiescent state of mind. It is not intended
to convey absolute certainty, or choice, such as the words "chosen" or
"accepted," whi6h would carry a sense of decisional finality. To
indicate union-majority support, Congress simply required that
employees who favor such representation give simple notice of that fact,
not necessarily notice of decisional certainty.
In other words,
105. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
106. See supra text accompanying notes 21-22.
107. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)(B); see also supra text accompanying note 34.
108. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
109. Designate, DICTIONARY.COM, http://www.dictionary.com/browse/designate (last visited
Nov. 25, 2017).
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"designated" connotes the minimum. action and communication
Congress required to initiate the bargaining process that the Act
endorses. And designation by the employee's signature on a verifiable
union authorization card-which is comparable to myriad examples in
commercial transactions that require only a signature-should again be
sufficient to require bargaining under section 8(a)(5), absent a showing
of a critical number of those cards to be fraudulent. Such a process
complies with the central policy of the Act, for according to statutory
text1 10 and the Supreme Court's assessment, "[t]he central purpose of the
Act was to protect and facilitate employees' opportunity to organize
In
unions to represent them in collective-bargaining negotiation."' i'
view of what has happened to the election process in recent years-with
employers having effectively gained tactical control of that process12
facilitating employees in the means by which they demonstrate their
majority status is certainly appropriate.
The Board should therefore follow the Supreme Court's reminder
in Gissel that the Act "refers to-the representative as the one 'designated
or selected' . . . without specifying precisely how that representative is to
be chosen. ' 11 3 And the Court there reiterated that "[w]e have
consistently accepted-this interpretation of the Wagner Act and the
present Act, particularly as to the Use of authorization cards" and "that a
'Board election is not the only method by which an employer may
satisfy itself as to the union's majority status.', 11 4 Accordingly, it is
time-in fact long past the time-for the Board to complete the answer
to the specific questions that the Court left open in Gissel. 5 The time
has come to undercut Linden Lumber.

110.
follows:

National LaborRelations" Act-§ 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151. The Act's policy clause reads as
It is hereby declarel to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the
caused of certain substahtial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to
mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they have occured by
encouragirig the' pra&tice., and procedure of collective bargaining and. by
protecting the exercis"lby workers of full freedom of association, selforganizatioh, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for
the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or
other mutual aid or protection.

Id.
111. Am. Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606, 609 (1991) (emphasis added).
112. See supra notes 5-6.
113. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 596 (1969).
114. Id. at 597 (quoting United Mine Workers v. Ark. Flooring Co., 351 U.S. 62, 72 n.8
(1956)); see also supra notes 28-30.
115. See supra text accompanying note 48.
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1. A Pragmatic Proposal
As the foregoing analyses have established, a literal reading of the
Act supports recognition that union authorization cards obtained from a
majority of the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit should
suffice to support majority-based duty to bargain under section 9(a) of
the Act and that such a determination by the Board would be1 16a
permissive application of statutory text that passes judicial muster.
Notwithstanding, however, such a bare-bones approach to the
authorization card issue leaves room for improvement because a proper
majority-verification system that relies solely on authorization cards
should also seek to assure both a high degree of accuracy in its
designations and a means to discourage and guard against fraudulent use
of those cards. A valid complaint that has been raised against relying
only on cards instead of secret ballot elections is that some cards may be
dishonestly obtained by forgery or involuntary signing. 117 Although
such improprieties may be rare, the fact that they might occur and go
undetected is reason enough to favor a procedure that will discourage or
prevent such inappropriate conduct. Wholesale substitution of elections
for all card-checks, however, would be throwing out the baby with the
bath-as the Linden rule has done.' 18 There is a better way, indeed a
simple unobtrusive way that conforms to statutory intent while also
discouraging fraudulent use of cards. Such a prophylactic approach is
here proposed.
What I am proposing is the following:
A union's authorization cards signed by a majority of the
employees in an appropriatebargainingunit will establish that union 's
section 9(a) majority-status,provided the voluntary signing of each such
card was observed and verified by a witness who has so indicated by
also signing that card,which shall be dated accordingly.
An employer who has been requested to recognize and bargainwith
a union that purports to rely upon such cards as the section 9(a)
representative of its employees will be required to grant such

116. See supra notes 113-14.
117. See Allison R. Hayward, Bentham & Ballots: Tradeoffs Between Secrecy and
Accountability in How We Vote, 26 J. L. &POL. 39, 68-69 (2010).

118.

See Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co., 190 N.L.R.B. 718, 720-21 (1971), enforcement

denied sub nom. Truck Drivers Local No. 413 v. NLRB, 487 F.2d 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1973), rev'd sub
nom., Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co.v.NLRB, 419 U.S. 301 (1974).
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recognition and bargain collectively unless, within fourteen (14)
calendar days following the union's request for recognition, it gives
notice to that union, with a copy to the Regional Directorof the NLRB,
that it declines to accept the reliabilityof those cards andfiles a petition
for an election pursuant to section 9(c)(1)(B). Upon the filing of such
petition, the Board, acting through its Regional Office in accordance
with its normal proceduresunder applicablerules and regulations,shall
take temporary possession of those cards, which it shall investigate
along with any profferedproofprovidedby any of the parties regarding
their reliability. If in accordancewith normal representation-caserules
and regulations applicable to section 9(c), it finds that there is no
convincing proof of the invalidity of the union 's majority claim, it will
have no "reasonablecause to believe that a question of representations"
119 exists, whereupon an election will not be conducted and the
employer
will have a duty to recognize and bargain with the union in good faith
pursuant to the Act's unfair-labor-practiceprovisions. If however, it
finds that the union's alleged card-majority is unreliable, it shall
conduct an election pursuant to the aforesaid section 9(c)(1)(B), in
which event the result of that election shallprevail. However, should the
employer withdraw its objection to the union 's cards at any time prior to
the holding of an election, the union's card-majority shall be deemed
valid and the requirementsfor bargainingby the employer pursuant to
sections 8(a)(1), 8(a)(5), and 9(a) shall apply.
In compliance with the above proposed rule, a union that wishes to
base its bargaining status on a card-majority may do so by following a
few easy steps. It should simply see to it, and require, that all
authorization cards be voluntarily signed by each employee in the
presence of a witness, and that the witness verifies that fact by signing
and dating the card.

119. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act of 1935 § 9(c)(l)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)(B)
(2012). For the full pertinent text of the applicable clause, see supranote 34.
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The following is a sample-but only a sample-of an authorization
card that meets theabove qualifications:

I,

voluntarily authorize the

_hereby

(Print name)
to represent me for the purpose of
(name of union)
collective bargaining with my employer

.

(name of employer),
in accordance with the National Labor Relaiofs Act,

(date)

(signature)
Witnessed by
(signature)

The aforesaid rule would encourage unions to exercise extreme care
in the solicitation of employees in the signing of authorization cards; and
the witnessing-process should' produce~ onJy'!Jegitimately signId cards.
This prophylactic approach would produce not only conmpliance with the
requirements of the Act, it would also eliminate any lingering question
as to the capacity of authorization cardssto 'accurately' reflect the
designated will of the employees who signjthern.2 -Replacemefit of the
Linden rule with this proposed rule would represent a return.to the basic
policy of the Act.
Such a replacement of the Linden rule would be clearly permissible
under the Act, for Congress left it to the. Board to define and approve the
The
means by which employees "designate" union representation.,
proposed procedure accomplishes that task and also provides a fair and
efficient means to avoid fraudulent manipulation of authorization cards.
Adoption of this rule can be achieved either by the process, of

120.

See supranote 33 and accompanying text.
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adjudication, 121 or.through the formal rulemaking procedure provided by
123
122
Either means would be appropriate.
section 6 of the Act.

VI.

CONCLUSION

I fully realize that the anti-union employer lobby will oppose this
proposed rule on the ground that it is likely to drastically reduce, if not
virtually eliminate, the role of union elections in the collective
bargaining process. Congress did not require such elections, however,
and-as legislative history and Supreme Court reviews unequivocally
confirm-the Taft-Hartley Congress expressly rejected such a
requirement. 124 This is not to say, however, that there will be no further
role for union elections. They will still be used and sometimes required.
Union organizing for collective bargaining rights based solely on card
majorities will be but one path to union recognition, and it is likely that
many union organizational drives will continue to rely on the familiar
election process. 125 Let the market decide the usage.
The anti-union lobby will also complain that card-authorizations
will limit employers in their opportunities to engage in free-speech
presentations to employees regarding the pros and cons of union
representation. Based on how employers have misused pre-election
speech in the past, 2 6 however, such limitations, which only affect
timing, are appropriate. Employers in nonunion workplaces have
unlimited control over when, where, and how they communicate with
their workforce.1 27 Replacing Linden Lumber with the rule proposed
here will simply restore what Congress intended: that employees should
have the right to easily obtain union representation that will give them
meaningful participation in determining their wages and other conditions
of employment. The lessons, of history remind us that widespread
collective bargaining by a. strong ,labor movement can be a key element
in helping to rebuild the American middle-class and a healthy economy.

121. This is how the Linden rule was promulgated. Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co. v.
NLRB, 419 U.S. 301, 310 (1974).
,
122.

29 U.S.C. § 156 (2012).

This is how the rule in American Hospital Ass'n was

promulgated. Am. Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606, 618 (1991).
123.
See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 292-93 (1974).
124.

See supra Section H.A.

125.
126.
127.

See NLRB v. Gissel Packaging Co., 395 U.S. 575, 602 (1968).
See supra notes 5-6.
See supra text accompanying note 6.
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